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Advertised-Product Liability:
Viewpoint of the Consumer
Catherine H. Hote*
W HEN ADAM SMITH described his self-regulating economy
in the 1770's, he assumed that its motive power would
be provided by the interplay of mutual demands and concessions
between economic entities, and that such interplay would result
in a balance of power. Since that time, the growth of huge cor-
porations that employ modern technology, complex manufac-
turing processes, mass production, and mass advertising, into
"clusters of private collectivisms" has substantially upset any
such supposed balance of power.
The Position of the Consumer
The resulting disparity in bargaining strength has been at
the expense of the individual unorganized consumer. Moreover,
the very technological force that has given the consumer a
superior product in many instances has made him correspond-
ingly less capable to judge good from bad. The development of
elaborate goods with buried technical qualities, the creation of
superficially unique "kinds" of products through the exploitation
of minor differences, distinctive packaging, and brand names,
together with the multiplication of unstandardized grades and
sizes, and conflicting advertised claims, have only increased con-
sumer confusion.
However, the vulnerability of the consumer has not gone
unrecognized. The protections already available include such
extralegal helps as the cooperative, the magazine "institute," the
advisory facilities of professional associations (such as the
American Medical Association and the Better Business Bu-
reaus), and services like Consumer's Research. There are also
legal protections. Regulations include state and federal food,
drug, and cosmetic laws; safety and sanitation regulations for
the manufacture of clothing, bedding, and electrical equipment;
licensing laws regulating the production of such commodities as
liquor, baked goods, and milk, and the selling of articles by
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auctioneers, brokers, and peddlers; statutes regulating advertis-
ing and labeling; statutes governing the ownership and sale of
dangerous items such as firearms and gasoline; and laws pro-
tecting trade-marks and guarding against the passing off of a
seller's articles as those of another. In addition, there are
antitrust laws, installment sale and usury restrictions.
The law has also given the consumer weapons to wield him-
self. In private legal controversy, he has available the doctrines
of negligence, fraud and deceit; the doctrines of duress and un-
due influence; the law of warranty; laws protecting in some cases
the title of the bona fide purchaser for value; and doctrines of
rescission and avoidance for incapacity because of infancy, in-
sanity, and sometimes marriage.
Some of these laws are intended primarily for the protection
of the consumer; others benefit him incidentally.
Despite the foregoing protections, the consumer's vulner-
ability has increased with the increasing superiority of the
maker's ability to know the ingredients and capacities of elabo-
rately manufactured commodities. The consumer turns to the
law for new protections.1
Direct Liability in the Manufacturer
The simplest approach is to create a direct liability to the
consumer without fiction or analogy. A few states that have
done away with privity rules have done so largely because policy
I See Dickerson, Products Liability and the Food Consumer, 3-5 (1951);
Burr v. Sherwin Williams, 42 Calif. 2d 682, 268 P. 2d 1041, 1048 (1954); Foote
v. Wilson, 104 Kans. 191, 192, 178 P. 430 (1919); Kniess v. Armour & Co., 134
Ohio St. 432, 442 (1938); Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble, 138 Minn. 10, 54
N. W. 2d 769, 771 (1952); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St.
244, 248, 4 0. 0. 2d 291, 294, 147 N. E. 2d 612, 615 (1958) ; Pillars v. R. J. Rey-
nolds Tobacco Co., 117 Miss. 490, 500, 78 S. 365, 366 (1918); 2 Harper and
James, The Law of Torts, 1573-footnote (1956). See also: Worley v. Procter
and Gamble, 253 S. W. 2d 532 (St. Louis, Mo. Court of Appeals) (1952)-
"food products . . . and . . . other articles dangerous to life"; 1 Williston on
Sales, Secs. 237, 244a, 617, 618, 648-649 (Rev. ed. 1948); Baxter v. Ford Motor
Co., 68 Wash. 456, 12 P. 2d 409, 412, 15 P. 2d 1118, 88 ALR 521, 526 (1932);
(See also: Free v. Sluss, 87 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 933, 197 P. 2d 854 (1948)-
where a soap package contained a printed guaranty of quality; Bahlman
v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N. W. 309 (1939)-where an
automobile manufacturer represented the top of a car to be made of seam-
less steel; and Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N. C. 542, 8 S. E. 2d 813(1940)-where a representation on a label stated that the insecticide was
non-poisonous to human beings); Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189
Iowa 775, 176 N. W. 382 (1920); Anderson v. Tyler, 223 Iowa 1033, 274 N. W.
48 (1937); Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 27 0. App. 475, 161 N. E. 557 (1928);




considerations are said to require absolute liability of the manu-
facturer. There appear to be two policy considerations: (1)
Manufacturers' liability tends to correct the evil at its source.
(2) Such a liability provides a kind of consumer insurance
whereby the aggregate of people consuming the particular prod-
uct, by paying slightly higher prices, share the financial burdens
caused by defective products. 2 This is called "spreading" the
risk or loss.
There are two separate issues here: (1) Should the manu-
facturer bear the final burden of liability where the defect is
traceable to the product in his hands? (2) If so, should the
manufacturer be directly liable to the consumer?
It is usually assumed that for improperly fabricated goods
the manufacturer is the proper person to bear the full brunt of
civil responsibility. The reasons are: (1) the manufacturer
made the goods and ought to stand behind them; (2) he is in the
best position to control their quality; and (3) he is the appro-
priate person to generate the basic price increase which, with
increases by subsequent sellers, results in spreading the risk or
loss. 3
It is possible to impose absolute liability on the manu-
facturer with the ultimate legal benefit accruing to the injured
consumer without doing away with privity. This is by a chain
of buyer-seller actions against the retailer, the respective inter-
mediate distributors, and the manufacturer. The argument
against this approach is that courts should avoid circuity of
action where the manufacturer is accessible to the consumer.
"Perhaps the most convincing argument for extending the obli-
gation of warranties, to subvendees at least, lies in avoiding
piling up of costs where each vendee can sue his vendor and
liability will rest eventually in the manufacturer or a remote
vendee. ' '4 Unnecessary circuity wastes time and money. "A
system which depends upon a series of recoveries over is not
only wasteful and circuitous, but subject to constant failures." 5
The financial burden of unavoidable injuries can be shared
by consumers by the device of spreading the risk or loss through
increased manufacturer's prices. Risks that are unavoidable as
a class (by the manufacturer) are usually caused by the manu-
2 Notes, 7 Wash. L. Rev. 351, 358 (1932); 10 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1925).
3 Dickerson, op. cit., 273.
4 Comment, 33 Col. L. Rev. 868, 869, n. 7 (1933).
5 Note, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 414, 418 (1929).
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facturer's suppliers, employees, or other third parties. Here
liability tends to result in pressure by the manufacturer on the
person at the root of the trouble.
One argument against the imposition of absolute liability on
the manufacturer to the consumer is that the change in the rule
requiring privity should be left to the legislature and not to the
courts. "In substance that may be true, but if it is judicial legis-
lation to hold that an old rule no longer obtains, it is just as
much so to create a new exception to the old rule to cover the
particular case." 6
Another objection is that a new and substantial hazard
would be added to the many already confronting the manufac-
turer. "If it is not too great a burden on the manufacturer of
food stuffs, the same burden should not be too great for any
other manufacturer. Moreover, allowing warranty suits directly
against the manufacturer would not make him absolutely liable
for the quality of the products he placed upon the market. The
ordinary elements of an action for breach of an implied war-
ranty of fitness for the purpose would still have to be shown,
viz: (1) That the seller knew the purpose for which the goods
were bought; (2) Reliance on the seller to furnish goods reason-
ably fit for such purpose. This would be an effective limitation
against any unreasonable attempts to hold him liable."' 7 In
addition, each manufacturer could protect himself to a large
degree by inspecting his products carefully and advertising them
cautiously.
A law review note neatly summarized the arguments for
making the manufacturer strictly accountable to the consumer:
Notably in the case of food products, sold in original
packages, and other articles similarly dangerous to life if
defective, the manufacturer, who alone is in a position to
inspect and control their preparation, invites and even re-
quires the reliance of the consumer. Whether he purveys
his product by his own hand, by his clerk, or by a network
of distributing agencies, the essence of the situation may
be the same-a justifiable and damaging reliance by one
person upon the self-serving representations of another. To
recognize the applicability of the principles of warranty to
all of these situations would be in keeping with the realities
of modern economic life.8
6 Note, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 315, 325 (1937).
7 Ibid.
8 42 Harv. L. Rev., op. cit. n. 5, at 419.
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ADVERTISED PRODUCTS-CONSUMER'S VIEW
So far as the consumer is concerned, it makes little differ-
ence who ultimately pays the bill as long as he is compensated
for his injury or loss and the product is improved. As Dicker-
son 9 points out, the arguments for placing absolute liability in
the manufacturer are strong but are based on some assumptions
which are oversimplified and not always realistic: (1) The re-
tailer and intermediate distributors are relatively small enter-
prisers with no substantial knowledge or control of the product
and, with relatively small dollar volume, they play a subordinate
economic role.1° (2) The relatively rich and powerful manufac-
turer produces a single product in large volume and is in the
origin of all defects. Dickerson suggests a different approach-
absolute liability of the manufacturer and distributors, aiming
at liability of the primarily responsible defendant. If the
sellers in the chain of manufacture and distribution are
made absolutely accountable to the consumer for the quality of
the goods leaving their hands, the injured consumer could easily
reach the person who is in the best position to correct the defect.
When the consumer can recover directly against any seller to
whom or through whom defective goods can be traced, in all like-
lihood he would set up a claim against the nearest available and
most attractive "Big Name" in the manufacturing and distribut-
ing chain. The most attractive defendant, from the compensation
viewpoint, is probably able to control the quality and price of the
product itself or to be in a position to collect from those who do.11
This approach would facilitate compensation and prompt elimina-
tion of the source of contamination or negligence.
Product Liability Insurance
With the small businessman, whether retailer or manufac-
turer, the problems of absolute responsibility are perplexing.
Where the defendant is a chain store, or even a large independ-
ent, it is very well to say that a constant and moderate claim
pressure is a useful inducement. But, with the corner grocer or
shoestring manufacturer, the pressure of claims will be sporadic
and entails the risk that a single blow may put the victim out of
business. How is the small merchant to be protected adequately?
9 Dickerson, op. cit. n. 1, at 273-274.
10 Note, 18 Corn. L. Q. 445, 451 (1933); see also note, 42 Harv. L. Rev., op.
cit. n. 5, at 417.
11 Dickerson, op. cit. n. 1, at 277-279.
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This brings up the question of the availability of product
liability insurance. "Occasionally, liability insurance policies are
issued which are specifically designed to protect the producer
or manufacturer of goods against loss by reason of injury to the
person or property of others caused by the use of his products.
Such policies are but a variant of the usual liability insurance
policies, devised to care for the specialized situation presented
by persons who in the course of their business are exposed to
claims by third persons on the ground that their products caused
injuries or damages after they were no longer in the possession
of the insured." 12
The hazards covered by product liability insurance policies
are usually described as accidents arising out of "the handling
or use of, the existence of any condition in or a warranty of
goods or products manufactured, sold, handled or distributed
by the named insured, other than equipment rented to or located
for the use of others but not sold, if the accident occurs after the
insured has relinquished possession thereof to others and away
from premises owned, rented or controlled by the insured." 13
As with other types of insurance contracts, the general prin-
ciple that the policies, having been prepared by the insurer, must
be construed most strongly against the insurer and in favor of
the insured, applies to product liability insurance. 14
Most cases dealing with product liability provisions raise the
question of whether a specific loss or risk is within the coverage
of the provision. The construction of a particular word or phrase
in the product liability provision usually provides the answer to
this question.15
Frequently liability insurance policies contain provisions
specifically excluding from coverage liability for injury or de-
struction of goods or products manufactured, sold, handled, or
distributed by the insured. Such product exclusion clauses deny
coverage in those cases usually covered by product liability
policies.
12 45 ALR 2d 994, 995.
13 Schafer v. Maryland Casualty Co., 123 F. Supp. 873, 877 (D. C. S. C.,
1954).
14 45 ALR 2d, 994 et seq.
15 For example, George W. Deer and Son v. Employers' Indemnity Corp.,
77 F. 2d 175 (C. A. 7, 1935)-"accident"-to be construed in usual sense
meaning mishap; Boeing Airplane Co. v. Firemen's Fund Indemnity Co.,
44 Wash. 2d 488, 268 P. 2d 654, 45 ALR 2d 984 (1954)--"account"-held to
mean for the advantage, profit, or benefit of the insured.
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol8/iss1/8
ADVERTISED PRODUCTS-CONSUMER'S VIEW
A typical product liability exclusion clause provides that the
policy does not cover "the handling or use of, the existence of
any condition in or a warranty of goods or products manufac-
tured, sold, handled or distributed by the named insured, other
than equipment rented to or located for use of others but not
sold, if the accident occurs after the insured has relinquished
possession thereof to others and away from premises owned,
rented or controlled by the insured or on premises for which
the classification is stated in the declaration as subject to this
exclusion." 16
If a specific loss or risk comes within the terms of the prod-
uct liability exclusion clause and within the meaning of the
clause, the insurer is relieved of liability for the occurrence.
However, if it does not so fall, then the insurer's liability must be
determined in accordance with some other provision of the
policy. Whether or not the insurer is liable in this case usually
depends on the construction of a particular term or phrase con-
tained in the exclusion.17
Although product liability insurance is available, many
small sellers are unaware of the risk or are unaware that such
coverage is available. Then, too, there may be some question
whether some sellers can afford the premium expense.
The problem of expense has greatly decreased recently. In
1951 it was said that: "Premium rates were originally high be-
cause an underwriting practice that concentrated on the livelier
risks resulted in an adverse selection of business. Now that more
of this insurance is in effect, a broader and more favorable ex-
perience has lowered loss ratios sufficiently to permit substantial
reductions in premium rates. On the average, rates for bodily
injury have been about halved since 1939 and minimum premiums
have dropped in most cases from $75 to $35 or less; the minimum
for some food stores has dropped from $75 to as low as $15 or less.
The result has been to make this kind of protection much more
widely available. Even so, some doubt remains as to how many
small sellers can even now afford protection." 18
One device for providing cheap insurance for the small man-
ufacturer and dealer is the deductible policy, under which the
16 Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 224 F. 2d 293, 295 (C. A.
3, 1955), 54 ALR 2d 513, 517.
17 54 ALR 2d 518, 520.
18 Dickerson, op. cit. n. 1, at 266.
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insured pays all losses up to a certain amount and the insurer pays
all losses in excess of the named limit.19
Unfortunately, those who can most easily afford the premium
expense need it least. Large risks tend to level off, and large
companies which are covered by product liability insurance are
actually only purchasing the services of a claim department. Al-
though larger companies are entitled to lower rates in some
cases, the costs of this claim service are found by many to be
greater than the cost of financing their own claim departments.
This is the reason for the large number of "self-insurers." 20
Coverage is limited to accidents arising during the term of
the policy, which may run from one year to three years, and to
sales reported to the insurer as the exposure basis on which
premiums are determined. Usually these policies are written on
a "5-and-10" maximum basis with an aggregate limit of $25,000.
Product liability insurance would seem to furnish adequate pro-
tection to at least the intermediate risk for whom the pressure of
claims and the possibility of a large judgment represent a serious
threat.21
Our serious concern rests with the small enterpriser who is
either ignorant of the protection available or feels that he
cannot afford the cost. But the dangers here are more ap-
parent than real. With the substantial reduction in rates
(which are geared to the insured's volume of business) and
minimum insurance premiums, this category has been sub-
stantially narrowed and is now highly marginal. More im-
portant, it is the Big Name in the chain of distribution that
attracts and absorbs the pressure of claims, even though the
little fellow is thrown in as makeweight. . . . Occasionally
the large manufacturer includes his distributors as an addi-
tional risk when taking out insurance. Actually, therefore,
the small seller has little to fear where his products are spon-
sored by large reputable houses. His own financial insig-
nificance is his best protection.
22
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 267.
21 Ibid., 268.
22 bid.
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